In May 1995, an international team characterized and contained an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Active surveillance was instituted using several methods, including house-to-house search, review of hospital and dispensary logs, interview of health care personnel, retrospective contact tracing, and direct follow-up of suspect cases. In the field, a clinical case was defined as fever and hemorrhagic signs, fever plus contact with a casepatient, or fever plus at least 3 of 10 symptoms. A total of 315 cases of EHF, with an 81% case fatality, were identified, excluding 10 clinical cases with negative laboratory results. The earliest documented case-patient had onset on 6 January, and the last case-patient died on 16 July. Eighty cases (25%) occurred among health care workers. Two individuals may have been the source of infection for ú50 cases. The outbreak was terminated by the initiation of barrier-nursing techniques, health education efforts, and rapid identification of cases.
In 1977, a fatal case of EHF was recognized in a child from Edgar Allan Poe, The Masque of the Red Death, 1842 Tandala, DRC, 325 km from Yambuku [5] . Investigation of this case led to the retrospective identification of a case in 1972 Ebola (EBO) hemorrhagic fever (EHF) is a lethal viral hemand suggested that EHF was endemic but sporadic in northern orrhagic fever with person-to-person transmission and the po-DRC. In 1979, a 34-person cluster of cases with a 65% case tential to cause major epidemics. It was first recognized during fatality was noted in southern Sudan; the cases had direct links the course of parallel outbreaks in Equateur region in northern to an index patient employed in the same textile factory that Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in adjacent was implicated in the 1976 outbreak [6] . In Côte d'Ivoire in southern Sudan in 1976 [1, 2] . The outbreak in northern DRC 1994, the isolation of a new strain of EBO from an ethologist was centered around the town of Yambuku near the banks of who had necropsied a chimpanzee not only extended the geothe Ebola River and was characterized by extensive nosocomial graphic distribution of known cases and strains but also protransmission in a mission hospital (mainly from needle reuse), vided another tantalizing clue about a possible role for nonhuwith 318 documented cases and 280 deaths (88% case fatality) man primates as a link for these viruses in human outbreaks over a 2-month period. The southern Sudan outbreak appeared [7] ; imported cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) from to originate among workers at a cotton factory in Nzara and the Philippines had been associated with the Reston subtype subsequently spread to Maridi, where disease was amplified in of EBO virus in the United States in 1989 and 1990 [8] [9] [10] . a large, active hospital. A total of 284 cases, with 151 deaths Also in 1994, an outbreak of EHF occurred north of Makoukou, (53% case fatality), were documented over a 5-month period.
the provincial capital of Ogooué-Ivindo, Gabon; there were 44 Despite the geographic and temporal coincidence of these outcases and 28 deaths (64% case fatality). This outbreak was breaks, the implicated viruses were genetically related but disoriginally misdiagnosed as yellow fever and subsequently was tinct subtypes [3] . The necessity for the highest level of biologic ascribed to the Zaire subtype of EBO virus [11] . Although key containment for these agents was rapidly established after a epidemiologic and control measures were elucidated during laboratory infection occurred in England [4] . these investigations, a reservoir for these virus subtypes remains unknown. In May 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was notified of an outbreak of viral hemorrhagic fever testing, and the presence of acute or recent EBO virus infection Specimens were obtained on 4 May and sent to the Institute of Tropical Medicine. The specimens were forwarded and subwas confirmed for all 14 persons tested. Within 48 h of diagnossequently arrived at CDC on 9 May, where testing confirmed tic confirmation, a multinational contingent led by the World EBO virus as the etiologic agent for the disease in all 14 Health Organization (WHO), composed of physicians, epidepatients. From that point on, the original ad hoc committee miologists, sanitarians, health educators, and logistic support evolved into an international commission to manage the outpersonnel from WHO, CDC, Institut Pasteur, Epicentre, Méde-break. The various activities of this commission, such as patient cins sans Frontières, Institute of Tropical Medicine, and the management, community education, transportation of cadavers, International Red Cross were dispatched to assist DRC authoriand research activities, are described elsewhere in this suppleties in controlling and characterizing the outbreak [12] [13] [14] [15] .
ment. This report describes the surveillance methodologies and key Not unexpectedly, surveillance activities proved extremely epidemiologic characteristics of this outbreak.
difficult. Initial case counts were based on nonsystematic reports from various hospitals, clinics, and private individuals.
Background
Reports of cases and deaths often conflicted from day to day. Because no public health surveillance system existed within Kikwit (population Ç200,000), the former regional capital Kikwit or its environs, one had to be constructed de novo by of Bandundu region, is located on the banks of the Kwilu River, using a patchwork of paid and unpaid volunteers with various Ç475 km east of Kinshasa, the capital of DRC. The economy levels of skill, experience, background, and tenure. The foreign of the area is based on agriculture, hunting, and fishing, with members of the international commission were just as diverse, the majority of the populace commuting to the surrounding and the problem was compounded by language and cultural secondary forest for subsistence. As in the rest of DRC, a differences. Surveillance was hindered by many logistic diffideclining public sector has recently had devastating effects on culties, including the lack of transportation and telephones. It the community's health care, education, transportation, and was also hampered by confounding societal forces that led to communication facilities. The two major hospitals are Kikwit concealment and denial of cases to avoid the social stigmata General Hospital (350 beds) and Kikwit II Maternity Hospital that rapidly became attached to those with the disease and to (100 beds). Reportedly, a small nosocomial cluster of EBO the contradictory reporting of noncases in the belief that this cases among the nursing staff at Kikwit II Maternity Hospital could lead to some tangible benefit for the afflicted family or was first recognized but misdiagnosed as epidemic dysentery village or reporter. Retrospective surveillance was also initially in early April 1995.
limited by the early impression that all febrile hemorrhagic Toward the end of April, a similar nosocomial cluster was deaths prior to that of the laboratory technician from Kikwit identified at Kikwit General Hospital among the operating room II hospital were due to epidemic dysentery. staff who participated in a surgical procedure on a laboratory The commission's health education campaigns proved chaltechnician employed at Kikwit II Maternity Hospital; the palenging because of the lack of mass media, closure of all tient had been transferred on 10 April to Kikwit General Hospischools, unpaid health care workers in hospitals and many tal for a laparotomy to treat a suspected typhoid-associated health centers, and an estimated literacy rate of 55%-61%. abdominal perforation. No perforation was noted intraoperaEducation of the populace was conducted using leaflets, posttively, and the patient underwent an appendectomy during the ers, and banners strung across the main roads. The Kikwit exploration. The next day, the patient had increased abdominal Diocese of the Catholic Church helped to disseminate accurate pain and distention, with a diagnostic bloody abdominocenteeducational material at church gatherings. In addition, educasis. A repeat laparotomy was done to exclude bleeding around tional messages were broadcast by megaphone through the the appendix suture site; it revealed diffusely bleeding abdomistreets of Kikwit and by word of mouth from commission nal contents. The patient died 2 days later. Within several days members to the populace. Health care providers at the local of his death, physicians and nursing personnel, including 2 hospitals received individual instruction on the use of protective Italian missionary nurses involved in his care, became ill with clothing and equipment, diagnostic features of the disease, case a febrile disorder suggestive of a viral hemorrhagic fever. The definitions, and patient management. Training for Ç60 health unusual nature of these cases was recognized independently at care workers from the Kikwit sentinel health clinics and 30 Kikwit II Maternity and Kikwit General Hospitals and two regional physicians was conducted in 2 separate sessions on other regional health facilities that managed these patients and 12 and 14 May, respectively. Individual training sessions for their subsequent contacts.
other local and regional health care workers and facilities were An ad hoc committee was locally established on 1 May conducted as needed, and protective equipment was provided. 1995 to examine the presumptive epidemic dysentery deaths. Methods In consultation with the physicians at Kikwit General Hospital, that cases have contact with another case-patient and that they first aid workers) and others who went from door to door in neighborhoods to identify probable cases. meet clinical illness criteria, and the definition categorized suspected cases into either probable or clinical (''clinque'') cases on Hospital and sentinel health clinic surveillance. A 2-or 3-member team was assigned to review the patient logs at Kikwit the basis of the presence of hemorrhage. Since education of suspected cases and their family members was our major intervention General Hospital and the 11 main functioning mission and public (i.e., sentinel) health clinics at which staff had initially been strategy, this case definition was modified on 13 May to be highly sensitive and identify individuals who may not have recalled or trained, and they provided protective equipment. Case-report forms were completed for all patients who met the surveillance case have had an obtainable history of contact with a case-patient. A probable case was defined as someone who had (1) an unexplained definition and forwarded to the central registry for completion or for inclusion as case reports and for follow-up. fever and contact with another case-patient; (2) unexplained fever plus §3 of 10 symptoms (abdominal pain, anorexia, asthenia, Death registry. By 13 May 1995, most of the corpses for fatal cases of suspected EHF and those for persons with unexplained simple [nonbloody] diarrhea, dysphagia, dyspnea, headache, hiccups, myalgia or arthralgias, and nausea or vomiting); or (3) unexdeaths were collected by the secourists, who forwarded case-report forms to the central registry for completion. plained acute hemorrhagic signs or symptoms, such as melena, hematemesis, petechiae, or epistaxis. In an effort to completely Active surveillance and family follow-up. A temporally variable group of 22-44 second-and third-year medical students from ascertain the geographic and temporal nature of this outbreak, this case definition was not restricted to any region of DRC or to a the Bandundu Medical School, Kikwit, were paired into teams to follow up on all suspected cases to complete case-report forms time frame. Operationally, however, case-finding occurred in the Bandundu region from 13 May to 1 July 1995 for cases with onset and to determine if the individuals met the surveillance case definition. If persons who met the case definition were still residing in dates after 1 January 1995 (prior to the onset date of the first identified case). A case-report form was completed on all such the household, they were instructed to seek medical evaluation and possible hospitalization at Kikwit General Hospital to cliniprobable case-patients in addition to all unexplained deaths for whom additional information was garnered to determine if they cally verify the diagnosis and prevent spread to household members. Family members of probable case-patients were educated on otherwise met the case definition. This field-case definition was the basis for all case counts reported during the course of the how to reduce their risk of infection if the ill individual continued to reside in the household. These family members were revisited outbreak after the arrival of the international team.
For the purpose of this report, with the availability of the final at least 3 times a week for 3 weeks following their last contact with the probable case-patient prior to death or convalescence to laboratory results, the case definition was revised as follows: (1) individuals with negative laboratory results who otherwise met the ascertain if secondary transmission had occurred. Nurses previously trained in the sentinel clinics also visited the household of field-case definition were excluded and (2) acutely ill individuals for whom clinical information was insufficient to meet the fieldprobable case-patients to distribute basic protective material (e.g., a pair of gloves, soap, and wash basin) as needed and to reinforce case definition but who otherwise had laboratory data confirming an acute or recent EBO virus infection (i.e., presence of detectable the educational messages about risks of transmission and symptoms suggesting disease in subsequent family members. antigen or IgM antibodies) were included as case-patients. Healthy individuals with no recent disease history and from whom blood specimens were drawn for antibody surveys were not included as case-patients if EBO antibodies were detected.
Regional Surveillance
Bandundu regional surveillance and case-finding was divided into two separate components maintained by the regional surveilSurveillance and Case-Finding lance team, which was responsible for appropriate follow-up and interventions. Efforts were markedly hampered by the scarcity of Surveillance was conducted separately for the city of Kikwit motor vehicles and an almost nonexistent communication system. and the surrounding areas of Bandundu region, but the data were Rumor surveillance for suspect cases. Similar to the system coordinated through a central data registry and epidemiologic subwithin the city of Kikwit, suspected cases from within Bandundu committee. After 1 July 1995, reports of probable cases were no region were reported to the commission. Cases from outside Banlonger being systematically collected and were not recorded in the dundu region were reported to the National Committee on Hemorcentral database, although DCR officials continued to monitor the rhagic Fevers in Kinshasa. families of some of these individuals.
Mission radio network surveillance. Voice contact by shortwave radio system (''phonies'') was made each morning with all 23 Catholic missions functioning in the Diocese of Kikwit, an area Surveillance in Kikwit and Surrounding Area comprising several health zones (''zones de santé'') around the city, to inquire about possible case-patients and obtain follow-up City of Kikwit surveillance and case-finding during the acute phase of the outbreak was divided into four separate components information on villages with known cases within the last 3 weeks. In addition, individuals from Protestant churches and from the as follows.
Rumor surveillance for suspect cases. Any persons suspected public with radios were contacted as needed. All suspected case-patients were visited by members of the reof having viral hemorrhagic fever could be reported by the public to 2 sites in Kikwit for appropriate follow-up and intervention.
gional surveillance team from Kikwit or by local health care workers who had been trained in Kikwit. Probable case-patients were These activities were supplemented by the secourists (Red Cross Besides the initial family cluster and other associated cases, EHF was already well established in Kikwit II maternity and Kikwit General Hospitals before the large nosocomial outbreak contracted EHF from a nosocomially infected patient who had Data collection was not uniform for all suspected cases because undergone a cesarean section at Kikwit II hospital and was of the evolution of the surveillance system and inherent difficulties subsequently admitted to Kikwit General Hospital.
in collecting information about deceased persons, but similar variables were analyzed in this study.
The date of disease onset was unavailable for Ç10% of susAmplification and Time Course of the Epidemic pected cases, and for the rest, it was often disputable. However, the date of death was invariably available and rarely in dispute.
At least four generations of cases were traced through the cases, was clearly evident: Only 1 health care worker developed disease after institution of preventive measures (8 days later; Results figure 2 ). All health care workers, except the 1 who became sick after institution of the extended personal protective mea-
Index Patient and Initial Cluster of Cases
sures, had previously provided care without these precautions and had become ill within an incubation period of their last The first identified case-patient was GM, a 42-year-old male charcoal worker and farmer who became ill on 6 January 1995 unprotected contact with case-patients. The final infected health care provider had laboratory-confirmed infection 15 days after and died of a febrile hemorrhagic disease at Kikwit General institution of these precautions. This provider tended 2 casesubsequent disease as part of the follow-up surveillance for suspect deaths. EBO antigens were detected in this patient's patients in a separate 2-room building and wore a disposable HEPA filter mask and eye protection in addition to gloves, tissue specimen by immunohistochemistry on 8 September 1995. gowns, and boots; however, she claimed to have inadvertently rubbed her eyes with soiled gloves. In addition, we could not exclude the possibility of an occult needle stick or otherwise
Case-Finding and Characteristics of Case-Patients
assess adherence to all other infection-control precautions.
The last identified case was a 27-year-old housewife from A total of 315 case-patients met the revised case definition for EHF; 314 had onset dates between 6 January and 20 June Nzinda, Kikwit. She died at home on 16 July 1995, shortly after discharge from Kikwit II hospital, where she was hospital-1995, and the case-patient who died on 16 July (mentioned above) was retrospectively added to the final case count (figure ized for management of a septic abortion. Her cadaver was brought to Kikwit II hospital on the day she died and was 3). All case-patients for whom information was available resided within 3 administrative subregions of Bandundu region: transferred to the morgue, where a postmortem biopsy specimen was obtained the next day and transported to CDC with Kikwit (262 cases), Kwilu (45 cases), and Kwango (1 case) (figure 4). This area represented 10 of 39 health zones encomother such samples on 27 August 1995. Her surveillance casereport form indicated that she had contact with a case-patient, passing Ç30 affected villages, although 268 (87%) of the cases came from Kikwit, and 17 (6%) came from Mosango. These and she had fever, headache, vomiting, anorexia, diarrhea, asthenia, abdominal pain, dyspnea, and melena. Additional histwo towns were the principal foci of infection and source of secondary case-patients, some of whom went back to their tory was unavailable at that time, but the diagnosis of EHF or septic shock was indicated on the form by the medical director villages and died without subsequent disease transmission. A major hospital located in Mosango (80 km west of Kikwit) of Kikwit II hospital. The postmortem sample was not flagged in any way to indicate that it was obtained from a patient with admitted patients and was a site for subsequent nosocomial transmission of disease. All affected villages were within a 150-a highly suspicious clinical illness and was collected as part of the nonsystematic process by which access to corpses was km radius of Kikwit. A single case-patient, who was infected in Kikwit, was hospitalized in Kinshasa, but no secondary transprovided after the presumptive last case. However, 13 family members of this individual were monitored for 21 days without mission occurred despite the initial lack of barrier-nursing pre- cautions. No case-patient associated with this outbreak was two case-patients (7.5%) were children or adolescents (£16 years). Eighty (25%) of the 315 case-patients were health care identified outside DRC.
Of 310 case-patients for whom information was recorded, workers. The overall case fatality was 81% (250/310). A linear decrease in mortality was noted from January (100%) to June 165 (53%) were female. The average age of case-patients was 37.4 years (median, 37; range, 2 months to 71 years). Twenty-(62%) (x 2 for linear trend by month, P õ .0001). A significant difference in age was noted among survivors compared with with maternal fatality; however, these data were not collected systematically. nonsurvivors (32.8 vs. 38.5 years, respectively; P £ .01). A crude onset-to-onset period based on an estimation in the mean The field case definition was met by 318 persons, 92 of whom had samples collected for diagnostic testing. Laboratory difference in onset dates between a case-patient and the implicated source of infection was 14 days.
testing was positive for EBO virus infection for 82 case-patients and negative for 10. Only 315 cases met the revised case defiHospitalization was noted for 80% (247/310) of case-patients. The mean number of days from onset to hospitalization nition because the 10 individuals with negative laboratory results were replaced by 7 case-patients, as indicated in the Methfor 219 patients was 5 days (median, 4; range, 0-19). There was a mean of 4.6 days (median, 4; range, 0-20) from hospitalods section, with positive laboratory results and for whom clinical information was not available. The positive predictive ization to death for 185 nonsurvivors for whom data were available. The mean number of days from hospitalization to value of the field-case definition was 89%. The high positive predictive value of the case definition used in the field is based discharge for 34 survivors for whom data were available was 17 (median, 14; range, 0-56), and the mean number of days mainly on laboratory confirmation during the second half of the outbreak because only 1 person with disease onset prior to from symptom onset to death for 224 patients was 9.6 (median, 9; range, 0-34). Reported signs and symptoms up to the time 14 May 1995 had laboratory-confirmed infection. Moreover, because specimens were obtained mainly from survivors, we when the case-report form was completed (often on admission to the hospital but frequently covering the whole course of cannot exclude that this estimate may include a selection bias because of the large number of missing laboratory confirmaillness for retrospectively identified case-patients) are listed in table 1. Some form of frank hemorrhage (gingivorrhagia, metions for case-patients who died; all the case-patients with laboratory-negative results were alive. lena, hematemesis, or petechiae) was reported for 37% (82/ 219) of case-patients; subconjunctival hemorrhage was exPrior contact with a suspected case-patient was reported by 93.5% (159/170) of case-patients for whom data were available. cluded because this sign was often confused with conjunctivitis. Eight abortions were reported, 4 of which were concomitant Eleven case-patients reported receiving an injection within 3 weeks of onset of symptoms (mean, 3 days; range, 1-6). An presence of classic disease with clear chains of transmission, unexpected observation during this outbreak was the identifimultiple hospitalizations, and a very high case fatality rate is cation of 2 persons as a potential source of infection for Ç20% disturbing. Equally disturbing was the initial misdiagnosis of of all the case-patients (figure 5). The first individual, desigdysentery, resulting in an additional 4-to 6-week delay before nated as identification number (IDNUM) 3 (patient WB), was the correct diagnosis was considered and confirmed. This outa 29-year-old man associated with 38 secondary cases, although break demonstrated once again the propensity for this disease 10 of these also reported other potential sources of infection.
to affect health care workers when proper barrier-nursing proHe was a popular anesthetist at Kikwit General Hospital who cedures are absent (25% of all cases were among health care died with fulminant hemorrhagic disease at the end of April providers), and it demonstrated the potential for this disease to and had many visitors during his 8-day hospitalization. The be amplified in health care settings, even with little or no needle second person, IDNUM 2260, was a 45-year-old woman who reuse. Moreover, we reaffirmed that education and the use of died of hemorrhagic disease at Kikwit II Maternity Hospital at personal protective equipment can rapidly interrupt ongoing the end of May with 21 case-patients among her contacts, none disease transmission. These features emphasize the necessity of whom reported other sources of infection. Conflicting details of rudimentary public health surveillance coupled with adherof her case history suggest that she was misdiagnosed with ence to barrier-nursing precautions and infection-control pracdysentery before her cadaver was turned over to the family.
tices, such as elimination of needle and syringe reuse or proper Although the disease was well recognized in the community, sterilization of these items between uses. details to explain the large number of cases among her contacts Experimental studies of nonhuman primates have been helpare obscure; however, it appeared that most contacts occurred ful in assessing the potential routes of transmission of EBO postmortem during her traditional funeral, which included virus. Late in infection in monkeys, there are large amounts of washing and touching of the cadaver.
virus in saliva, feces, and urine, and ultrastructural and immune electron microscopy examination of tissue from the respiratory tract of monkeys has shown virus replication in type 1 pneumoDiscussion cytes, with abundant, apparently infectious, virions in alveoli and bronchi [19] [20] [21] . EBO virus requires only 1-2 pfu of EBO The magnitude of this EHF outbreak in DRC after an 18-virus must be retained in the alveoli to initiate a lethal infection year hiatus dramatically confirms the potential of EBO virus in the African green monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops), and to cause large outbreaks associated with high fatality. This was filoviruses are moderately stable in aerosol [19, 22] . Thus, it the first outbreak in a large population center in proximate is not surprising that intercage transmission, suggesting medialocation to the even larger population of Kinshasa, with its tion by small-particle aerosols, has been reported [23] . Howestablished intra-and intercontinental transportation links. The ever, direct application of EBO virus onto conjunctiva and newly described waves of death in the Kikwit community may ingestion has resulted in fatal monkey disease; therefore, largebe a reflection of the density of this large population. The 3-droplet dissemination may well be another mechanism for this month latency between occurrence of the first case in Kikwit, in January 1995, and recognition of the outbreak despite the observed intercage transmission [24] . The observed environmental stability of EBO virus (Swanepmembranes and indirectly via fomites and body fluids. The periodicity of deaths implies that direct contact due to burial oel R, unpublished data, 1995) raises the possibility of fomites as a source of infection [22] . Recent evidence of a copious rituals, which included washing and touching the cadaver, may have played a role in disease transmission. The pattern of transamount of viral antigen in skin and sometimes within the lumen of sweat glands, although its viability is unknown, suggests a mission of EHF from the infected person to the primary care provider and from that person to their primary care provider, potential mechanism for direct disease transmission through abraded skin or inoculation onto mucous membranes [16] .
without affecting household members who did not share nursing duties but who may have slept in the same room, further However, the barrier presented by intact skin is unknown. Direct observations in deceased EHF patients show the same suggests that airborne transmission was an unlikely route of transmission and is consistent with similar observations during abundant alveolar particles [17] , but we have no way of knowing if this material is aerosolized, is stable in the aqueous milieu the 1976 EHF outbreaks [1, 2, 25] . A large number of case-patients identified 2 case-patients as in which it is suspended [22], or is an equivalent infection for humans; thus, we must rely on field epidemiology to assess the their contacts, both of whom had gastrointestinal hemorrhaging. Although the number of contacts may have been biased influence of these multiple potential sources of transmission.
Field epidemiologic studies have found no human correlate by the reporting of an individual who was known to be a suspected case-patient and some reported secondary contacts, for aerosol infection, and airborne transmission has not appeared to play a role in human-to-human transmission, except the sheer magnitude of the effect suggests that it is not artifactual. The concept of a ''super-spreader'' or ''high-frequency for possibly in a rare subset of patients. The preponderance of evidence during this outbreak suggests that EBO virus was transmitter'' is novel for this viral hemorrhagic fever, and the mechanism for this high-frequency transmission is unknown. once again transmitted between humans via direct contact or direct projection (droplet spread) of droplets onto mucous
The large number of cases may simply have been a matter of a larger number of contacts of these case-patients or some vulnerability of human populations to these infections, and they highlight the potential for further large outbreaks and the lack inherent differences in the virus-host relationship. These differences could include a more virulent virus strain or high levels of information regarding the natural reservoir. Although investigation of previous cases has helped to refine of viral shedding; unfortunately, no samples are available from these case-patients. Enhanced transmission via a respiratory control measures, public health authorities remain unprepared to anticipate and prevent future large outbreaks. Prevention route (either small-particle aerosols or large droplets) is a remote possibility that is supported by the experimental data and requires better definition of the epidemiologic features of these diseases by clarifying their geographic distribution, the specevidence that a portion of experimentally inoculated animals are more likely to have alveolar disease. However, the onset trum of illness, and risk factors for both disease acquisition and transmission. Targeted serologic surveys using newly dedates of these secondary cases suggest that most of the contacts occurred during the course of a traditional funeral, when aeroveloped diagnostic assays that circumvent the specificity problems of older assays should also be done to define these issues. sols are unlikely to be generated. A similar increased risk for transmission of viral hemorrhagic fevers in a hospital setting While recognizing that the general lack of facilities and infrastructure remains the paramount problem in dealing with this has been reported for Lassa fever and Bolivian hemorrhagic fever [26, 27] . An analogous super-spreader concept has been disease, we also need to provide ''field-friendly'' mechanisms prepositioned at regional sites for rapid identification of inrecognized for rubella and group A streptococci in addition to others [28, 29] .
fected individuals to anticipate outbreaks. However, even with simpler diagnostic technology, it will never be possible to make Key determinants for secondary transmission of infection remain unknown. Although the paucity of children with this a rapid field diagnosis in all locations, given the challenges imposed by a huge geographic area with spotty communication disease may be explained by shielding from contact with an ill family member, the lack of such secondary transmission in and transportation links to urban centers. A feasible approach would be to continue uncoupling the use certain settings is inexplicable [30] .
A large number of case-patients returned to their villages, of local prevention activities from the occurrence of laboratoryconfirmed diagnoses. All patients with suspected viral hemoryet no subsequent transmission was recorded in these settings. Similarly, many of the initial case-patients, including the prirhagic fever should be considered to be sentinel events and managed according to generic accepted guidelines [41] . A kit mary case-patient for the outbreak, were hospitalized without evident nosocomial transmission. This was also true for the comprising personal protective equipment assigned specifically for such patients and materials to collect specimens, with a case-patient hospitalized in Kinshasa who had active mucosal bleeding and was admitted with little or no barrier-nursing set of guidelines on preventing disease transmission, can be distributed to remote locations [41] . Integration of this kit into precautions. This unexplained lack of secondary transmission is in contrast to the many family clusters of disease, in which national health care surveillance protocols (governmental and nongovernmental) should help prevent additional disease asso-2-3 generations of secondary cases were documented. However, it further establishes that sporadic cases of unrecognized ciated with suspected EBO patients, allow for laboratory confirmation of remote cases, and help anticipate ''hot spots'' on EHF may not be uncommon.
Since this outbreak, EHF has continued to be identified in the basis of geographic or temporal clustering of confirmed cases. Africa, including a case from Liberia that was not confirmed by virus isolation [31, 32] . A recent outbreak of EHF in the village of Mayibout 2, Makokou Health District, Ogooué-
